Cryptanalysis of some protocols using matrices over group rings by Eftekhari, Mohammad
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
04
77
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 M
ar 
20
15
Cryptanalysis of some protocols using matrices over
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Abstract
We address a cryptanalysis of two protocols based on the supposed difficulty
of discrete logarithm problem on (semi) groups of matrices over a group ring.
We can find the secret key and break entirely the protocols.
Keywords. Key exchange, symmetric groups, representation of algebras.
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1.Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is the first published practical
solution to the key distribution problem, allowing two parties that have never
met to exchange a secret key over an open channel. It uses the cyclic group
F
∗
q, where Fq is the finite field with q elements. The security of this protocol
is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms (DL) in the group
F
∗
q. There are several algorithms for computing discrete logarithms, some of
them are subexponential when applied to F∗q.
It is important to search for easily implementable groups, for which the
DL problem is hard and there is no known subexponential time algorithm
for computing DL. The group of points over Fq of an elliptic curve is such a
group.
In [8], the group of invertible matrices with coefficients in a finite field was
considered for such a key exchange. In [6], using the Jordan form it was
shown that the discrete logarithm problem on such matrices can be reduced
to the same problem over some small extensions of the finite base field.
In [4], the authors consider the semigroup of matrices ( 3-by-3 matrices) over
the group ring F7[S5], where S5 is the group of permutation of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The security of this protocol is based on the supposed difficulty of the dis-
crete logarithm problem in the (semi) group of matrices with coefficients in
F7[S5].
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Moreover in [5], the authors propose the same semigroup as a platform for
the Cramer-Schoup cryptosystem which is a generalization of ElGamal’s pro-
tocol. Here the security is based on the supposed difficulty of the discrete
logarithm problem in the group of invertible 3-by-3 matrices with coefficients
in F7[S5].
In [1], [2] and [7] a cryptanalysis of [4] is proposed. Their methods are some-
how different. In [1], the problem of discrete logarithm in a semigroup is
reduced to the same problem in a subgroup of the same semigroup. In [2]
one uses a slight modification of Shor’s quantum algorithm to find the period
of a singular matrix (there is no notion of order for such a matrix) and therby
solving the discrete logarithm problem in semigroups. In [7], Mat3(F7[S5])
is embeded in Mat360(F7) and then one uses the same procedure as in [6]
(adapted to singular matrices). The conclusion of all three papers above is
that using a quantum computer one can break the key exchange protocol of
[4].
In contrast to the above analysis we use the irreducible representations of
the group S5; then using the fact that the algebra F7[S5] is semi-simple, we
give an isomorphism between this algebra and an algebra of block matrices
with coefficients in F7. Then we use this isomorphism to give an isomorphism
between Mat3(F7[S5]), and still another algebra of block matrices over F7.
To do so, we combine the same blocks of the first isomorphism.
This way we reduce the discrete logarithm problem over Mat3(F7[S5]), to
the same problem over block matrices with coefficients in F7. The maximum
size of a block is 18, reducing dramatically the computations. Now we can
apply the same procedure (eventually modified for singular matrices) as in
[4], to each block and resolve the problem of discrete logarithm entirely (us-
ing actual computers) and find the secret key. So the conclusion is that the
platform proposed in [4] and [5] are simply insecure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1, will be devoted to
the irreducible representations of S5. In section 2, we explain the isomor-
phism between matrices with coefficients in F7[S5], and block matrices with
coefficients in F7, and show that the protocols proposed in [4] and [5] can be
broken. Finally we conclude with some remarks in section 3.
2. Irreducible representations of S5
For our purpose, it will be easier to use the following presentation of S5. We
note W := (12) and Z := (12345). The group S5 is defined by generators
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W,Z and relations T , where T is the following set of relations:
W 2 = id
Z5 = id
(ZW )4 = id
WZ−1WZW = Z−1WZWZ−1WZ
[W,Z−2WZ2] = id
[W,Z−3WZ3] = id
The group S5 has two distinct representations of dimension one (namely
the trivial one and the signature), two non isomorphic irreducible represen-
tations of dimension four, two non isomorphic irreducible representations of
dimension five, and one irreducible representation of dimension six. We give
the images of the generators Z and W by these representations , and one
can verify the relations T , for the images, thereby proving that one defines
morphisms from S5 to matrix groups. One can compare the trace of these
morphisms with the character table of S5 to be sure we obtain all the irre-
ducible representations of S5.
To construct these representations one can follow the general description of
[3], using Young polytabloids, to construct the Specht modules which give
the irreducible representation of S5.
W = (12) 7−→ A1 ⊕ A
′
1
⊕ A4 ⊕A
′
4
⊕ A5 ⊕ A
′
5
⊕A6 where
A1 = 1; A
′
1
= −1;A4 =


−1 0 0 −1
0 −1 0 1
0 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 1

; A′4 =


1 0 0 1
0 1 0 −1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 −1


A5 =


−1 0 1 0 −1
0 −1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 1


; A′
5
=


1 0 −1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 −1


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A6 =


−1 0 1 0 1 0
0 −1 −1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


Z = (12345) 7−→ B1 ⊕B
′
1
⊕B4 ⊕ B
′
4
⊕ B5 ⊕B
′
5
⊕ B6 where
B1 = 1; B
′
1
= 1; B4 =


0 0 0 1
−1 0 0 −1
0 −1 0 1
0 0 −1 −1

; B′4 =


0 0 0 1
−1 0 0 −1
0 −1 0 1
0 0 −1 −1


B5 =


0 0 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 −1
1 0 −1 −1 0
0 1 1 1 1


; B′
5
=


0 0 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 −1
1 0 −1 −1 0
0 1 1 1 1


B6 =


0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 −1 0 −1 0
0 1 1 0 0 −1
0 0 0 1 1 1


3. Cryptanalysis of protocols
In [4] the authors propose the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using 3-by-3
matrices over F7[S5]. So Alice and Bob, take a public matrixM ∈ Mat3(F7[S5])
which may be non-invertible. Alice chooses a secret integer n, computes Mn
and sends it to Bob. Bob chooses a secret integer n′, computes Mn
′
and
sends it to Alice. Every party can now compute the common key Mnn
′
.
In [5], they use the same platform for the Cramer-Schoup cryptosystem which
we do not recall. We underline only that there is a public key M as above,
and during the protocol among other data sent, there is Mn where n is the
secret key. So if we are able to give a solution for the discrete logarithm
problem in the case of M ∈ Mat3(F7[S5]), in both cases the platform pro-
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posed is not secure. That is what we are going to explain.
As 7 does not divide |S5| = 120, the algebra F7[S5] is semi-simple and
Maschke’s theorem asserts that this algebra is isomorphic to a direct sum
of matrix algebras (over F7), in other words it is isomorphic to an algebra of
block matrices over F7. Let us denote by f this isomorphism. To be of any
use for our purpose, we have to make precise this isomorphism explicitly. The
F7-linear extension (to F7[S5]) of the morphism of S5 using the irreducible
representations of S5 given on generators W = (12), Z = (12345) in section
2, gives the isomorphism f between F7[S5] and its image. So for any element
x =
∑
120
i=1
aixi ∈ F7[S5] , ai ∈ F7 and xi ∈ S5 we can compute its image as a
direct sum of matrices with coefficients in F7.
Up to now we have represented a matrix M ∈ Mat3(F7[S5]) as a matrix with
coefficients in F7 by replacing each coefficient Mij of M by f(Mij). For ex-
ample M11 is replaced by A =


a1
a′
1
a4
a′
4
a5
a′
5
a6


where ai, a
′
i
are block matrices with coefficients in F7 and the indices denote the size of
the block.
Let us denote by A,B,C,E, F,G,H, I, J the block matrices correspond-
ing toM11,M12,M13,M21,M22,M23,M31,M32,M33. Then B is a block matrix
which we represent the same way as A by denoting b1, b
′
1
, b4, b
′
4
, ... its blocks.
We use the same notations for C,D, .... It is an easy computation to prove
that there is a natural isomorphism between matrices

A B C
D E F
H I J

 and the block matrix whose first block is obtained by com-
posing (side by side) the first blocks of A,B,C,D, ... ,namely


a1 b1 c1
d1 e1 f1
h1 i1 j1

,
which gives a 3× 3 matrix over F7.
The second block is obtained by composing the second blocks ofA,B,C,D, ...,
namely


a′
1
b′
1
c′
1
d′
1
e′
1
f ′
1
h′
1
i′
1
j′
1

, and so on.
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To resume, we represent the matrix M ∈ Mat3(F7[S5]) by a block matrix
in F7 whose blocks are of size 3, 3, 12, 12, 15, 15, 18. We represent also the
matrix Mn by a block matrix with the same size 3, 3, 12, 12, 15, 15, 18 in F7.
Now we can apply the same technics as in [6], namely write the Jordan form
of each block in some small extension base F7α and find the secret key n.
Note that for singular blocks, we need a slight modification of the procedure
of [6], as proposed in [7].
3. Conclusion
We showed that using matrices with coefficients in F7[S5] as a platform for
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is not secure. One may wonder if replacing F7
by F2,F3 or F5 give something essentially different. In fact in these cases the
group algebra is not semi-simple anymore and Wederburn’s theorem cannot
be applied. But these new algebras are not far from being semi simple; in fact
they differ from being semi simple by a nilpotent radical, and the quotient
is semi simple and then the same procedure as explained in section 2 can be
applied. To resume we believe that no secure cryptographic protocol can be
based upon these algebras.
Furthermore replacing the group S5 by some other finite group G, can be
cryptanalyzed the same way using the irreducible representations of G.
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